Executive Summary
Relations between Armenia and the EU have not only reached an unprecedented level, but have also gradually transformed from a largely recipient-oriented relationship into a more reciprocal one, where both sides can benefit. First, Armenia signed a framework allowing the country to participate in EU-led crisis management missions and operations. Although Armenia’s contribution might remain limited, it is an important signal to the European Union. Armenia has also developed its military-industrial complex from a prototype-based industry towards serial production, opening new opportunities for cooperation with the EU. The second field of cooperation concerns the “Crossroads of Peace” and TRIPP, connectivity projects offering not only additional routes from Asia to Europe, but also creating investment possibilities for the EU.
While Armenia’s geographical position is of importance for regional and global actors, Armenia’s democratisation efforts make the country politically and institutionally more compatible with the EU and thus, in the long term, a potential strategic partner in the region. Furthermore, Russia’s gradual decline in influence and the strengthening of the European presence in Armenia benefit Brussels in a geopolitically contested region. Another factor that could be of interest to the EU is Armenia’s political relations with Tehran, potentially allowing Yerevan to serve as an additional communication channel between Iran and the EU.
While European engagement in the “Crossroads of Peace” could be delayed due to Russia’s management concession rights over Armenia’s railway system, Armenia and the EU can deepen their cooperation through the Global Gateway. More importantly, Armenia should deepen its security relations with the EU, particularly by establishing an EU-Armenia Security and Defence Partnership, which could create better conditions for further cooperation, including in the context of SAFE (Security Action for Europe) and EDIP (European Defence Industry Programme). Beyond this, military-industrial cooperation between Armenian and European companies opens new opportunities for both sides through the exchange of experience, joint research and potentially joint production. Finally, Armenia should position itself not only as a recipient in the field of hybrid security, but also as a contributor by sharing its own practical experience with EU member states.
Introduction
The debate on EU-Armenia relations in Armenia is mostly marked by the question of how Armenia could benefit from the European Union. While this is an important question, especially in terms of security, political and economic diversification, another question remains largely unanswered: Eurosceptic forces in Armenia often argue that Armenia cannot offer much to the European Union and is thus a low-priority country from a European perspective. This raises a broader question: How can the EU benefit from Armenia?
Relations between Armenia and the EU have deepened in recent years and have reached an unprecedented level. It should also be mentioned that the nature of the relationship has gradually changed. While Armenia remains a recipient of substantial EU support, it is increasingly seeking to position itself as a contributor as well. This policy brief will examine three aspects of this issue: Armenia as a security contributor, strategic partner and connectivity partner.
Towards a More Reciprocal Security Partnership
In recent years, Armenia and the EU have not only intensified their political relations, but also their cooperation in the field of security and defence. Armenia currently hosts two EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. The European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) is a civilian monitoring mission and was established in 2023 amid border tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Since the establishment of the mission, the number of border incidents has considerably decreased. In 2026, the EU established the European Union Partnership Mission in Armenia (EUPM), which supports Armenia in countering hybrid and cyber threats. Besides these missions, the EU has provided support to Armenia through the European Peace Facility (EPF), allowing the EU to finance non-lethal equipment for the Armenian Armed Forces.
In 2025, Armenia began to move from being fully a recipient towards a more contributor-oriented status. In the same year, the sides launched their first Security and Defence Consultations, aimed at discussing possible cooperation in the field of security and defence. On 30 June , Armenia and the EU signed a Framework Participation Agreement, allowing Armenia to participate in EU crisis management missions and operations. The agreement entered into force on January 1, 2026. This marks an important development in bilateral relations and signals to the EU that Armenia is not only a recipient, but is also willing to contribute to the common security architecture. While Armenia's contribution is likely to remain limited in the short term, the agreement creates further opportunities for Armenia to gradually integrate into the EU's security structures.
Armenia has also rapidly expanded its military-industrial complex, scaling local contracts from approximately $14.4 million in 2022 to around $440 million in recent years. An additional $400 million is allocated for the period between 2026 and 2028. Research and development funding increased by 50% in 2025 compared to 2024. Although these volumes might not be comparable with those of global defence industry giants, they indicate impressive dynamics. More importantly, Armenia has gradually transformed its military-industrial complex from a prototype-based industry towards serial production, particularly in the fields of UAVs and electronic warfare systems. In 2026, Armenia was able to export domestically produced military equipment for the first time, opening a new chapter for the Armenian defence industry. The rapid expansion of Armenia's military-industrial complex, both in quantity and quality, provides new opportunities for cooperation between Armenia and the EU, especially taking into account that Armenia also has practical experience with modern warfare. The industrial partnership between Armenia’s BooTech and France’s Thales Group, signed in 2026 to share manufacturing experience, is a good example of how cooperation could benefit both sides.
Last but not least, while the EU supports Armenia in the fields of hybrid and cyber security through EUPM, this field of cooperation does not necessarily have to remain a one-way street. Armenia has been exposed to large-scale Russian hybrid activities, including cyberattacks, illicit financing and disinformation campaigns, particularly in 2021 and 2026. As a result, Yerevan has gained valuable practical experience that it could share with European partners.
Armenia as a Connectivity Partner
The “Crossroads of Peace” is a connectivity project initiated by the Armenian government in 2023, aimed at connecting the region through both East-West and North-South routes. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 42 km-long section in the south of Armenia, was brokered by the Trump administration and is intended to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhijevan through Armenia, while fully remaining under Armenian sovereignty. While TRIPP is primarily an Armenian-US project, with the US holding 74% and Armenia 26% of the shares in the planned TRIPP Development Company, questions about the possible participation of third parties remain open.
However, TRIPP and the “Crossroads of Peace” can benefit Brussels in two different ways. First, these infrastructure projects would establish an additional route connecting Asia and Europe. According to studies, including a study by the AMBERD Research Institute, new routes through Armenia could reduce the length of the China-Europe transit corridor by 5-10%. The establishment of these routes could also shorten trade routes from Armenia to Eastern Europe by up to 10-25% and to Central Europe by 5-15%. Unblocking communications in the region would thus not only benefit regional actors, but could also contribute to broader connectivity between Asia and Europe. Transit through Armenia would also create additional possibilities alongside the existing Azerbaijan-Georgia-Türkiye transit route. Nevertheless, these routes should not be seen as competing with each other, but rather as complementary. The “Crossroads of Peace”, particularly its North-South dimension, could also strengthen connectivity from India through Iran and Armenia towards Georgia and Europe.
Second, the “Crossroads of Peace” is not only about connectivity, but also about business and investment opportunities. The EU could become part of a promising regional infrastructure project, as the US is doing through TRIPP. While possible European involvement in TRIPP remains unclear, other routes and infrastructure projects can serve as potential fields of cooperation. International interest and investment underline the broader importance of these initiatives.
During her 2026 State of the Union address, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU aims to mobilise up to €12 billion in public and private investment through the Global Gateway strategy to connect the South Caucasus and Central Asia directly to Europe. This indicates that the EU has a direct interest in the development of regional connectivity projects and provides an opportunity for Armenia to position itself as an additional route connecting Asia with Europe.
However, some obstacles to possible European investments remain unresolved, particularly the Russian management concession over Armenia's railway network. Russian management of critical railway infrastructure creates sanctions-related and commercial uncertainty for potentially interested European investors. Resolving the concession issue could therefore improve Armenia's attractiveness and create additional opportunities for European participation in regional infrastructure projects.
Armenia as a Strategic Partner in the Region
In 2025, Armenia and the EU adopted the new Strategic Agenda for the EU-Armenia Partnership, aimed at deepening political and sectoral relations. Armenia’s diversification and soft-balancing efforts towards the West, particularly the EU and the US, position Armenia as a possible strategic partner in the region. Armenia as a potential strategic partner for the EU should be analysed along three aspects.
Armenia’s political pivot towards the West has fostered the EU’s presence in a geopolitically contested region, while the decrease in Russian influence creates a geopolitical advantage for Brussels. In recent years, the presence of Russian border guard troops in Armenia as well as the public trust in Russia has drastically decreased. In parallel, the EU’s physical presence through the two CSDP missions as well as growing political influence has created favorable conditions for Brussels to strengthen its position in the wider region.
Armenia’s democratic development since 2018 further strengthens its position as a potential strategic partner for the EU. Armenia currently ranks highest in the immediate South Caucasus and performs comparatively well in the wider region. In 2026, Armenia scored 54 out of 100 points according to Freedom House, thus outranking Georgia with 51 points. According to V-Dem’s 2026 Electoral Democracy Index, which measures the extent to which elections are free and fair and political freedoms are guaranteed, Armenia scored 0.61 and was classified as an electoral democracy, performing better than several EU candidate and member states, including Moldova, Albania, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. This development and Armenia's increasing alignment with European political norms provide the EU with a politically compatible partner in the region.
Another, no less important aspect from which the EU could benefit is Armenia’s political relations with regional and global actors. While relations with Russia remain problematic, Armenia maintains good relations with Iran, Arab countries and India. Beyond the regional actors, Armenia has also developed functional high-level relations with the Trump administration, demonstrated by the Washington agreements of August 2025 and subsequent high-level exchanges between Yerevan and Washington. Armenia's network of relations therefore provides another potential asset for the EU. Yerevan could serve as an additional communication channel and facilitator, particularly in relations with actors such as Iran.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The developments of recent years indicate that relations between Armenia and the EU have reached an unprecedented level and that the relationship is not a one-way street, but offers reciprocal benefits for both sides.
Taking into account Yerevan’s relations with Moscow, some fields of cooperation may be more sensitive than others. This is particularly true for connectivity, where Armenia is trying to find diplomatic solutions regarding Russia’s management concession rights over the railway network. While Russian management of the railway system and unanswered questions regarding TRIPP may delay possible European engagement in the near future, both Yerevan and Brussels can deepen their cooperation in other regional connectivity programmes, including Global Gateway.
Against the background of EU Readiness 2030 and several European programmes aimed at increasing defence and military-industrial capabilities, Armenia could become an interesting partner both in exchanging manufacturing experience and in joint production. While several EU programmes remain exclusive and participation of third countries is limited, the further institutionalisation of security-related relations between Armenia and the EU could create better conditions for cooperation. More concretely, the establishment of an EU-Armenia Security and Defence Partnership, as in the case of Moldova, would be a practical and important step. Such a partnership could create more favourable conditions for Armenia’s participation in European defence initiatives, including SAFE and, potentially, EDIP.
Deeper integration could, at a certain point, raise the question of Armenia’s membership in the CSTO. Taking into account Armenia’s already frozen participation in the CSTO and the current state of Russian-Armenian relations, the costs of formally leaving the organisation might be limited in relation to the possible benefits of deeper security cooperation with the EU.
Besides a Security and Defence Partnership, Armenian and European defence companies should foster their practical relations. The cooperation between Armenian BooTech and the French Thales Group provides an example of how such partnerships could develop.
Last but not least, cooperation in the field of hybrid security should increasingly develop into a two-way exchange. Taking into account Armenia’s experience in recent years and the challenges several EU member states are facing, Yerevan could increasingly act not only as a recipient of European expertise, but also as a contributor by sharing its practical experience with European partners.
