September monitoring of Russian information influence targeting Armenia indicates a further development of mechanisms observed in August and a qualitative shift in messaging. Earlier narratives focused primarily on the costs of Yerevan’s strategic distancing from Moscow. During September, parts of the Russian information ecosystem increasingly portrayed Armenia’s reorientation as a process already leading to loss of sovereignty and growing dependence on Western, Turkish and Azerbaijani interests.
The monitored material repeatedly connected Armenia’s relations with Russia, the European Union and the United States with the future of the Russian military presence, security sector reform, the TRIPP project, relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and domestic disputes involving Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Armenian Apostolic Church. This does not demonstrate that all of these messages formed part of a single centrally coordinated operation. It does show a high degree of recurrence, adaptation and mutual reinforcement across Russian state media, commentary channels and parts of the Armenian information environment.
The dominant persuasive mechanism was the narrowing of Armenia’s perceived range of safe strategic choices. Other strategic directions were portrayed as more costly, less predictable or more dangerous than maintaining existing ties with Russia. This approach did not require Russia to be presented as an attractive or uncomplicated partner. Its effectiveness depended instead on increasing the perceived economic, political and security risks associated with other available directions.
Dynamics of Messaging in September: From Warnings About Costs to the Narrative of Armenia’s “Takeover”
The September material shows a gradual expansion of the same basic persuasive structure. At the beginning of the month, the emphasis was on the direct economic and security costs of reducing dependence on Russia. During the middle of the month, Western cooperation, TRIPP and relations with Turkey became increasingly associated with external control and new dependencies. By the final days of September, parts of the messaging were portraying the loss of Armenian sovereignty as an already ongoing process.
Between 1 and 9 September, Russian messaging focused on the strategic choice between maintaining existing relations with Moscow and closer integration with Western institutions. Economic benefits associated with the Russian market, energy supplies and the Eurasian Economic Union were contrasted with the expected costs of changing orientation. At the same time, debate concerning the Russian 102nd Military Base in Gyumri was shifted towards the consequences of a possible withdrawal. A reduction of the Russian military presence was portrayed as creating a security vacuum and opening greater space for Turkish and Azerbaijani influence.
European visa liberalisation and the TRIPP project broadened this agenda. Local reports concerning possible conditions attached to visa liberalisation were transformed into a narrative of European “visa blackmail”. TRIPP was increasingly portrayed as a potential channel for long-term US strategic presence in the South Caucasus. Even limited procedural changes in the Armenian armed forces, including regulations concerning military honours, were interpreted as indications of progressive alignment with NATO standards.
Between 10 and 16 September, Turkey became more prominent in Russian messaging. Western engagement was increasingly presented as a process that could move Armenia into Ankara’s strategic orbit. This framing gave an abstract narrative about Western dependency a more locally resonant dimension, linking it to historical and contemporary Armenian threat perceptions concerning Turkey.
Economic arguments remained important. Russian gas was presented as a tangible benefit of cooperation with Moscow, while diversification, modernisation and changes in the energy sector were associated with new dependencies and a possible loss of control over strategic assets. Russian educational, cultural and linguistic projects were simultaneously promoted as evidence of durable and mutually beneficial relations.
Between 17 and 24 September, security messaging intensified. US assistance to the Armenian armed forces was juxtaposed with references to Afghanistan, Iraq, Georgia and Ukraine. These cases were used as warning scenarios suggesting that Western military support could increase dependency or contribute to confrontation. Russian institutional sources also became more visible, warning against replacing established Russian security arrangements with American alternatives.
TRIPP became increasingly important during the same period. Its presentation moved beyond questions of transport and infrastructure towards security, strategic control and foreign influence. Claims concerning the possibility of US military or intelligence infrastructure were accompanied by warnings about Turkish and Azerbaijani access to Armenian routes and assets. By 22–24 September, the language surrounding the project had escalated to include references to “colonisation”.
Between 25 and 30 September, Russian frames increasingly drew legitimacy from Armenian actors, opposition figures, commentators and polling data. Statements originating within Armenian political debate could be incorporated into Russian reporting and presented as local confirmation of previously promoted claims. The most radical messaging appeared in the final days of the month, when Western involvement, TRIPP, normalisation with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and domestic conflicts were combined into a broader narrative of Armenia already being “taken over”.
At the same time, Russia was presented as capable of reversing this process. Rosatom’s offer concerning Armenia’s nuclear energy sector supported a parallel positive narrative in which Moscow remained a provider of technologies, markets, energy and security assets that would be difficult to replace. The message therefore combined warnings about the cost of distancing from Russia with reminders of the practical resources still available through cooperation with Moscow.
The most important change across the month was the transition from warning about possible future consequences to describing external subordination as a process already underway. This shift created a stronger basis for portraying renewed Russian influence as defensive, corrective or necessary.
Source Laundering and Changes in the Status of Information: The Visa Narrative Case
One of the clearest cases of information manipulation observed in September concerned the narrative surrounding visa liberalisation and the alleged requirement to restrict the movement of Russian citizens. Its significance lies primarily in the way the status of the information changed at successive stages of circulation. The starting point was a local report concerning possible conditions linked to the visa liberalisation process. The information was uncertain in nature and required further confirmation. In subsequent reproductions, however, it was taken up by successive channels, while caveats concerning its source and reliability gradually disappeared. A possibility or hypothesis began to be presented as the position of the European Union, and subsequently as a demand to restrict the entry of Russian citizens into Armenia. At a later stage, the message acquired a political interpretation. A condition whose status remained uncertain was incorporated into a broader narrative of “visa blackmail” and presented as evidence that European integration requires Armenia to restrict its relations with Russia. Administrative information was therefore transformed into an argument concerning the geopolitical price of rapprochement with the European Union.
This case demonstrates a mechanism relevant from a FIMI perspective. Repeated amplification increased the reach of the message while simultaneously changing its status. As the information circulated, references to the uncertainty of the source disappeared, while the categorical nature of the claim increased. Ultimately, the recipient could encounter a message functioning as an established fact, even though its original basis was considerably weaker. The significance of this case lies in the possibility of tracing the full sequence through which the information was transformed, from an uncertain report, through successive stages of amplification, to a categorical claim circulating as fact. The visa narrative therefore constitutes one of the best-documented examples in the September material of a FIMI mechanism based on changing the status of information in the course of its distribution.
Sources, Channels, and Mechanisms of Amplification of Russian Messaging
Russian messaging targeting Armenia circulates through several overlapping information environments. These include Russian state institutions and state media, Russian-language commentary and social media, Telegram channels, Armenian-language portals, local commentators and general news services.
Sputnik Armenia represents one of the most direct channels of Russian state media presence in the Armenian information environment. Operating within MIA Rossiya Segodnya and publishing in both Russian and Armenian, it allows Russian narratives to reach different linguistic segments directly. RIA Novosti, TASS, RT and other Russian sources also provide statements, quotations and agency material that may subsequently be translated, summarised or adapted by other outlets.
Official institutions constitute another important source. Statements from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, security structures, diplomatic representatives and institutions responsible for Russia’s external presence provide material with high institutional status. During September, relatively cautious institutional warnings concerning the possible costs of Armenian policy decisions were frequently followed by much more radical commentary predicting loss of sovereignty, military vulnerability or state decline.
The strongest rhetorical escalation generally appeared in Russian-language commentary and social media. Terms such as “betrayal”, “colonisation”, the “Armenian Zelensky” and the need to restore Armenia to Russia’s sphere of influence were more prominent in this part of the ecosystem. Institutional messaging could therefore establish the initial issue, while commentators extended its implications.
Local Armenian actors play a separate role. A narrative formulated in the Russian information environment may later appear as a statement by an Armenian politician, expert, journalist, military figure or Church representative. Once incorporated into domestic debate, the same interpretation may subsequently return to Russian media as a “voice from Armenia”. This creates the possibility of repeated circulation in which the origin of the narrative becomes less visible.
The presence of a similar narrative in Russian and Armenian sources does not by itself demonstrate operational coordination. Local actors may independently reproduce particular interpretations for political, ideological or commercial reasons. Monitoring therefore distinguishes between Russian-controlled institutions, actors with identified links to Russian influence structures and local participants for whom no such connection has been established.
External research on the Armenian media environment has identified groups of local portals displaying high levels of content synchronisation and consistently pro-Russian editorial positions. Research on Telegram has also documented networks of pro-Russian channels and automated activity. These findings provide context for the monitoring but should be distinguished from evidence collected directly within the project.
Telegram is particularly important because it shortens the distance between an original statement and its more radical interpretation. A quotation can be removed from context, combined with commentary, graphics or video, circulated through additional channels and later incorporated into conventional media reporting.
Russian cultural and social infrastructure also operates alongside the media environment. Russian Houses, Rossotrudnichestvo projects, university cooperation, language promotion and cultural initiatives should not automatically be classified as FIMI. They nevertheless sustain networks of contact and Russian presence that coexist with political and media influence.
The broader significance of this system lies in the repeated circulation of similar frames across different types of sources. A statement may originate from an official institution, be expanded by media or commentators, circulate through Telegram, be adapted by a local Armenian actor and later reappear in Russian reporting. Such circulation does not prove coordination. It can, however, obscure the original source and create an impression that similar assessments are emerging independently across multiple environments.
The Cost of Strategic Autonomy as the Main Persuasive Frame
One of the most consistent frames in Russian messaging remained the portrayal of Armenia’s strategic efforts to reduce its dependence on Moscow as a process carrying high and immediate costs. The importance of the Russian market, preferential energy terms, and the economic benefits associated with Armenia’s participation in the Eurasian Economic Union were emphasised. European integration was contrasted with this as a direction that could entail more expensive energy, more difficult market access, and problems related to exports, transport, and investment. This mechanism relies primarily on loss aversion. The potential benefits of diversification are presented as distant, conditional, and uncertain, while the costs of reducing existing ties with Russia are portrayed as concrete and capable of being felt immediately. As a result, the focus of the debate shifts from the question of the long-term benefits of greater autonomy to the question of what Armenia may lose in the short term. Within this construct, the Russian market, gas, and infrastructure become not only elements of the existing dependency, but also arguments against attempts to reduce it.
Russian Military Presence as a Condition of Security
In the security sphere, one of the most important elements of Russian messaging remained the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri. The presence of the Russian base was presented as a fundamental guarantee of Armenia’s security, the loss of which would create a dangerous strategic vacuum. The messaging shifted the debate from assessing the effectiveness of the Russian military presence to the consequences of its possible termination. The base was described as the “last shield”, while the possibility of withdrawing Russian troops was linked to increased pressure from Turkey and Azerbaijan. In its most simplified form, the message reduced Armenia’s strategic choice to the assumption that limiting Russia’s presence would mean creating greater space for Turkish influence.
Towards the end of the month, this frame was reinforced by highlighting polling results indicating support among part of the population for the continued stationing of Russian troops. The focus of the debate was shifted towards the risks associated with the loss of existing security guarantees. As in the economic messaging, the existing dependency was thus presented as an argument against reducing it.
The West as an Actor Using Armenia Against Russia
At the same time, messaging was developed that sought to undermine the credibility of Armenia’s Western partners. The United States and European countries were portrayed as actors exploiting Armenia’s geographic position and its changing geopolitical orientation in order to constrain Russian influence.
Already at the beginning of the month, Armenia appeared in Russian messaging as a potential “battering ram” against Russia or as a tool in the hands of external actors. References to Georgia and Ukraine served to construct the image of a recurring scenario. This scenario consisted of a post-Soviet state drawing closer to the West, expanding political and military cooperation, experiencing a deterioration in relations with Moscow, and subsequently entering into conflict, with the state itself bearing the principal costs. Armenia was thus placed within a pattern previously applied by Russian propaganda to other countries in the region.
By the middle of the month, this frame had been further adapted to the Armenian context through stronger use of the Turkish threat. The West was portrayed both as treating Armenia instrumentally in its rivalry with Russia and as creating space for Ankara’s growing influence. In this messaging, NATO ceased to function as an abstract structure associated primarily with Washington or Brussels and began to be presented through the prism of Turkey, a state far more deeply embedded in Armenian historical memory and threat perceptions. This made it possible to give the broader narrative of Western subordination a much more local and emotional character.
NATO and the United States as an Illusory Alternative
In Russian messaging, Armenia’s cooperation with the United States and NATO was portrayed as a process leading to the gradual dependence of the country’s security system on Western structures. A characteristic mechanism involved attributing strategic significance to technical and procedural changes. The discussion concerning the manner of rendering military honours was presented as evidence of the Armenian armed forces’ transition to Western standards and as another stage in their “NATO-isation”. In this way, a limited regulatory change was transformed into evidence of a broader geopolitical process and a gradual loss of autonomy in the defence sphere.
Towards the end of the month, this frame was reinforced by information concerning US funding of military programmes and support for reforms of the Armenian armed forces. Russian institutional and commentary sources portrayed Western involvement as costly, protracted, and lacking any guarantee of effectiveness. Military cooperation with the United States and NATO was consequently positioned as a risky attempt to replace existing Russian guarantees with a system presented as less certain and more dependent on external conditions.
Ukraine as a Warning Scenario
Ukraine was used in Russian messaging as a warning of the possible consequences of Armenia’s geopolitical reorientation. Rapprochement with the West, the reduction of ties with Russia, and the development of cooperation with Western security structures were presented as successive stages of a process that could lead to confrontation with Moscow. The messaging did not demonstrate that the situations of Armenia and Ukraine were comparable; rather, Ukraine served primarily as a negative reference scenario for decisions taken by Yerevan.
Towards the end of September, this pattern was applied directly to Nikol Pashinyan, whom Russian commentators began to describe as the “Armenian Zelensky”. The term made it possible to condense into a single phrase a broader set of associations already present in Russian messaging: a leader subordinated to the West, deepening conflict with Russia, and leading his own state towards confrontation. The personalisation of the narrative thus reinforced the earlier message according to which Armenia’s strategic distancing from Moscow could lead to a repetition of the scenario portrayed by Russian propaganda as the “Ukrainian” one.
Turkey and Azerbaijan as Local Sources of Threat
An important element of Russian messaging involved embedding broader geopolitical narratives in concerns related to Turkey and Azerbaijan. Russia was portrayed as a barrier limiting the further expansion of Ankara’s and Baku’s influence, while a weakening of the Russian presence was presented as a factor increasing Armenia’s vulnerability to pressure from its regional neighbours.
In the second half of the month, more radical messages concerning Turkish expansion began to appear, including portrayals of Armenian territory as an element necessary to achieve the geographical completion of the “Turkic world”. This made it possible to link current disputes over infrastructure, security, and regional relations with the historically entrenched perception of threat associated with Turkey.
At the same time, the credibility of the peace process with Azerbaijan was challenged. Negotiations were portrayed as a sequence of unilateral Armenian concessions in which each compromise increased the scope for further pressure from Baku. In the most simplified version of the message, peace was equated with capitulation, and capitulation with further territorial and political losses. Such a frame shifted the interpretation of the peace process away from the category of reducing the risk of conflict and towards the loss of position and continued pressure from Baku.
TRIPP: From Infrastructure to “Colonisation”
The TRIPP project and the future of transport links through southern Armenia occupied an important place in Russian messaging during the period under review. Initially, they were presented as a threat to the regional geopolitical balance, then as a potential space for US military and intelligence infrastructure, and as a mechanism for increasing the influence of Azerbaijan and Turkey. In subsequent messaging, the transport project was increasingly framed in security terms. Infrastructure and economic risks began to be linked to the possibility of losing control over strategic routes, the growth of Turkey’s economic presence, and the erosion of Armenia’s effective sovereignty. By the end of the month, the frame of “colonisation” had appeared explicitly. TRIPP thus became one of the clearest examples of the narrative escalation observed in September. The project was moved out of the economic and infrastructure category and transformed into a symbol of geopolitical subordination and loss of control over the state.
Delegitimisation of Pashinyan and the Autonomy of Public Debate
Across the month as a whole, there was a visible shift from criticism of individual government decisions towards the personalisation of responsibility around Nikol Pashinyan. The Armenian Prime Minister was portrayed as the principal actor responsible for the country’s strategic distancing from Russia, a politician willing to make concessions to Azerbaijan, in conflict with the Armenian Apostolic Church, and leading the state in a direction whose consequences he was unable to control. This made it possible to combine developments concerning foreign policy, security, the peace process, and internal conflicts into a single image of crisis attributed to the decisions of a specific leader.
In the second half of the month, a similar logic was applied to Armenia’s public debate. Highlighting information about US funding of media outlets, journalists, and bloggers served to undermine the autonomous nature of pro-Western positions. The mere fact of foreign funding was presented as grounds for questioning the independence of its recipients, without the need to address the substance of their arguments or their editorial activities. As a result, delegitimisation extended not only to Pashinyan himself and his policies, but also to part of the environment participating in the debate over Armenia’s strategic orientation. A pro-Western position could be portrayed as the product of external influence and dependency, thereby calling its autonomous character into question. Such a frame narrows the space for debate and shifts the assessment of a political opponent from a dispute over the direction of state policy to the level of their alleged links with external actors.
The Church as an Arena of Identity Conflict
The conflict between the authorities and the Armenian Apostolic Church was among the most emotionally charged themes in September messaging. Russian and pro-Russian sources reinforced the interpretation of the government’s actions as interference in the Church’s autonomy and as an attack on one of the institutions symbolising Armenia’s historical and cultural continuity. This made it possible to shift the dispute from the level of current politics to the level of religion, history, and the moral legitimacy of the authorities. Criticism of specific actions by the Pashinyan administration was thus broadened to include the suggestion that the government was weakening not only a particular institutional environment, but also one of the fundamental points of reference of Armenian identity.
Towards the end of the month, the language of the messaging became further radicalised. The authorities’ actions were portrayed as an unprecedented campaign against the freedom of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Incorporating this conflict into the broader geopolitical narrative extended the image of Armenia’s strategic reorientation beyond foreign policy and security, encompassing also the sphere of the state’s symbolic foundations.
Russia as a Difficult-to-Replace Partner and, at the Same Time, an Offer
September messaging combined an emphasis on the risks associated with reducing relations with Moscow with the construction of an image of Russia as a state possessing resources, technologies, and an existing infrastructure of cooperation capable of offering Armenia tangible benefits. The importance of the Russian market, military potential, preferential energy terms, cooperation within Eurasian structures, and educational, linguistic, and cultural projects was highlighted. These were contrasted with the benefits of diversification, which were presented as more distant and uncertain, thereby reinforcing the image of existing relations with Russia as accessible, proven, and difficult to replace quickly.
A particularly clear example at the end of the month was the information concerning talks with Rosatom on the future of Armenia’s nuclear energy sector. In this case, Russia was presented as a provider of strategic technologies and expertise whose replacement would require time, new investment, and the development of an alternative technological base. This case formed part of a broader pattern in the portrayal of relations with Moscow, in which raising the perceived cost of alternatives was accompanied by an emphasis on the benefits of maintaining existing ties. Russia thus functioned as a partner that would be difficult and costly to replace, even with an awareness of the problems and constraints associated with that relationship.
Conclusion: Narrowing the Scope of Strategic Choice
September monitoring indicates that the main mechanism of Russian influence targeting Armenia was the asymmetric presentation of risk. Problems arising from the existing relationship with Moscow were portrayed as known and manageable, while alternative policy directions were presented as carrying costs that were more difficult to predict and potentially more dangerous. The strength of this messaging lay in its ability to adapt to a changing agenda. New developments could be incorporated into already established frames concerning security, the economy, sovereignty, identity, or external subordination. This made it possible to preserve continuity of messaging despite shifts in subject matter and to connect events of very different kinds within a similar interpretation of Armenia’s strategic choices.
The most important qualitative shift occurred towards the end of the month. Earlier warnings about the costs of distancing from Russia were partially replaced by messaging according to which the process of losing control and becoming subordinated to the interests of the West and Turkey had already begun. Within this logic, reversing that process was presented as a necessity. A potential effect of this configuration is an increase in the political and social cost of strategic change and the reinforcement of the perception that the available alternatives do not offer Armenia an equally secure path towards reducing its dependence on Moscow.
Annex
Catalogue of Identified Narratives and Persuasive Frames
Strategic choice and the cost of distancing from Russia. Armenia was portrayed as having to choose between Russia and the West. European integration was associated with direct economic costs, uncertain benefits and the loss of existing Russian market, energy and trade advantages. The underlying frame presented Moscow as the more predictable option even where dependence on Russia was acknowledged.
Russian military presence as indispensable. The 102nd Military Base was portrayed as a central security guarantee. Its withdrawal was linked to a security vacuum, increased Turkish and Azerbaijani influence and the loss of Armenia’s “last shield”.
The West as an unreliable or instrumental partner. Western interest in Armenia was described as part of a wider confrontation with Russia. Armenia was portrayed as a possible anti-Russian foothold, while US and NATO engagement was framed as creating new external dependencies rather than greater autonomy.
Ukraine and Georgia as warning scenarios. Cooperation with Western political and security structures was linked to scenarios of confrontation with Russia. The “Armenian Zelensky” label personalised this warning around Nikol Pashinyan.
Turkey as the principal local threat. Reduced Russian influence was associated with growing Turkish political, economic and strategic power. Western engagement was also portrayed as opening Armenia to Ankara through NATO and regional projects.
Peace with Azerbaijan as capitulation. Negotiations, border issues, prisoners and transport arrangements were combined into a narrative of successive Armenian concessions. Compromise was portrayed as encouraging further demands from Baku.
TRIPP as external interference. The project was linked successively to US strategic presence, the loss of control over transport routes, Azerbaijani and Turkish interests, Turkish economic expansion and eventually the “colonisation” of Armenia.
European visa policy as pressure on relations with Russia. Uncertain information concerning possible visa liberalisation conditions was amplified into claims of European “visa blackmail” and demands to restrict Russian citizens. The same narrative was extended to claims that Europe sought to weaken social and cultural ties between Armenians and Russians.
Economic pressure as the consequence of Armenia’s own choices. Possible reductions in Russian preferences or economic benefits were framed as the predictable price of Yerevan’s strategic reorientation. This transferred part of the perceived responsibility for potential Russian restrictions onto Armenian decision-making.
Energy dependence as stability. Russian gas and existing energy ties were presented as tangible and predictable benefits. Diversification and alternative technologies were associated with new forms of dependency and possible loss of energy sovereignty.
Russia as a technological partner that cannot quickly be replaced. Rosatom and other strategic sectors were used to demonstrate the depth of existing technological and infrastructure dependence.
Russia as resilient to Western pressure. The Russian economy and state were portrayed as capable of adapting to sanctions and preserving their international position, weakening arguments that Armenia should distance itself from a declining partner.
Pashinyan as the source of strategic risk. Separate disputes concerning foreign policy, security, the Church and the peace process were personalised around the Prime Minister and interpreted as evidence of a common direction weakening Armenia.
The government as dismantling Armenian statehood. Individual political disputes were incorporated into a wider narrative concerning the erosion of institutions, security, historical continuity and national identity.
The Armenian Apostolic Church as a target of the authorities. Government actions were portrayed as an attack on an institution central to Armenian historical and national continuity. Russian support for the Church helped present Moscow as a defender of traditional Armenian identity.
Western-funded media and civil society as externally controlled. Funding sources were used to question the independence of journalists, experts and civil society organisations and to portray pro-Western positions as products of external influence.
Pro-Russian actors as victims of political repression. Legal proceedings involving individuals associated with pro-Russian positions were incorporated into a broader narrative of government repression against an entire political current.
Bilateral Western contacts as evidence of geopolitical reorientation. Relations with states such as Poland were interpreted through the Russia-West confrontation and presented as additional signs of Armenia’s Euro-Atlantic shift.
Strategic reorientation as betrayal. Relations with Russia were connected to loyalty, history and “natural” alliances, allowing policy change to be framed in moral and identity-related terms rather than solely through state interests.
The “takeover” of Armenia as already underway. By the end of the month, Western engagement, TRIPP, military cooperation and regional normalisation were increasingly combined into the claim that Armenia was already losing strategic autonomy.
Restoration of Russian influence as corrective. Once Western and Turkish involvement had been defined as a “takeover”, stronger Russian influence could be presented as restoring security, sovereignty and a previous strategic balance.
Russia as the difficult but indispensable partner. The broader line connecting the September material presented other strategic directions as carrying greater risks. This allowed relations with Moscow to retain their value on the basis of familiarity and predictability rather than attraction.
