The historical political prerequisites for the formation of the Makkah agreement and the impact of the Iran war
On August 7, 2026 the signing of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) by the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman, the President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Shehbaz Sharif in Makkah, the spiritual center of Islam, became an important manifestation of the ongoing realignment in the security architecture of the Middle East and South Asia. The signing of the agreement was preceded by a preparatory process of almost three years under the conditions of an already formed long term defense cooperation between the three countries and a rapidly changing regional security environment.
One of the important prerequisites for the formation of the agreement was the large-scale military crisis that began in the Middle East following the events of October 7 2023, which later escalated into direct acts of war involving Israel, the United States and Iran. The military operations carried out by Israel in various directions of the region, including the strike delivered against the Hamas leadership in Doha (Qatar), the Twelve Day War of 2025 and the US-Israeli joint military campaign against Iran in 2026, raised serious concern in Riyadh as well as in Ankara and Islamabad.
On the other hand, the retaliatory military operations of Iran, involving the use of over 7000 missiles and strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against the civilian and military infrastructures of the Persian Gulf countries, as well as the de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, created a severe security crisis for the Gulf basin states. In this situation, the issue of the reliability of the United States as the traditional primary external guarantor of regional security became more evident. The limitations of the response of Washington and the question of to what extent the US can fully protect its Gulf partners strengthened the interest of Saudi Arabia in additional regional security mechanisms.
Another important contextual factor in the formation of the alliance was the Hexagon alliance project announced by the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu, which included Israel, Greece, Cyprus, India and certain participants of the Abraham Accords. This project was yet another indicator of the competing power alignments forming in the region.
The Makkah agreement was preceded by gradual institutional steps, the most significant of which was the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025 at the Al Yamamah palace in Riyadh. This bilateral pact formalized the decades-long military mutual assistance and the presence of Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia. Simultaneously the quadrilateral consultative format (R 4 Group) was established, which included Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt for the purpose of coordinating policies in the event of regional crises. Thus the Makkah agreement can be viewed as an attempt by three middle powers to strengthen collective deterrence in an environment exacerbated by the actions of Israel and Iran and at the same time to reduce dependence on a single external security sponsor.
The combination of trilateral resources and their practical complementarity
The key capability of the Makkah agreement lies in the complementarity of the military, financial, and technological capacities of the three participating states. Each party brings distinct comparative advantages to the alliance, collectively forming a military–financial–technological triad.
Türkiye can act as the technological and industrial driving force of the alliance. As the NATO state with the second largest army by personnel, Ankara possesses rich institutional experience in allied military planning, the formation of command structures and operational interoperability. The Turkish military industrial complex is capable of producing a wide range of modern weaponry from Bayraktar strike UAV to MILGEM class military ships. The 5th generation KAAN fighter jet project of Türkiye can have a special significance, around which Ankara is discussing cooperation opportunities with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia can secure the financial foundation and market of the alliance. Within the framework of the Vision 2030 strategy Riyadh aims to localize at least 50% of the volume of military procurements within its own territory. Large Saudi financial resources allow for the financing of expensive research and development (R&D) projects of the Turkish military industrial complex, as well as providing direct financial and investment support to Pakistan, which is under economic pressure. Furthermore Saudi Arabia possesses levers to influence global energy markets and significant political and religious influence in the Islamic world.
Pakistan brings to the alliance large and combat experienced armed forces. The Pakistani military has for decades carried out the training and security provision of the Saudi army. The unique factor however is the nuclear power status of Pakistan. Although there are no mentions of direct extended nuclear deterrence in published official materials, the nuclear status of Pakistan creates a strategic ambiguity that can inherently affect the calculations of adversaries.
The combination of these three elements can increase the independent regional security capability of the three countries, but it does not yet eliminate their dependence on external powers.
Institutional and military mechanisms.
A comparative analysis with the collective defense system of NATO
The central provision of the Makkah agreement stipulates that an armed attack carried out against any of the members of the alliance will be considered as an attack on all participants. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye Hakan Fidan characterized this obligation as technically identical to Article 5 of NATO, simultaneously emphasizing that the degree and form of military or other support provided will be determined through consultations between the parties. The full text of the agreement is not published, which limits the assessment of the legal and operational scope of the obligations.
The institutional architecture of the alliance has begun to take shape. On 31 August 2026, the first meeting of the Strategic Political and Defence Committee was held in Istanbul with the participation of the foreign and defence ministers and senior military leadership of the three states. The meeting marked the beginning of the institutional implementation of the agreement, while the permanent secretariat is to be based in Saudi Arabia and the practical mechanisms of cooperation remain under development. On the military platform joint military exercises with the participation of land, naval and air forces are planned, as well as cooperation in the direction of air defense and unmanned systems with the aim of increasing interoperability. In the military industrial sector joint development, production and technological cooperation are envisioned, and unmanned and autonomous systems, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence were noted as priority directions. Despite the proclaimed similarity, the Makkah alliance differs significantly from the structure of NATO.
The targets of deterrence, the Hexagon alliance and the transformation of dependence on the security umbrella of the US
The Makkah agreement forms a multi-directional deterrence logic in which the factors of Iran and Israel have different weights for the three participants. Although Turkish officials declare that the alliance is not directed against Iran, it can strengthen the capability of collective deterrence toward Iran. For Saudi Arabia, which has suffered from Iranian missile and UAV strikes, the deployment of Pakistani troops and air defense systems, as well as the deepening defense cooperation with Turkey, increase deterrence capabilities. The alliance adds the factor of the possible involvement of Türkiye and Pakistan into the calculations of Tehran.
Israel is also a factor in the alliance’s strategic environment; however, the threat perceptions of the three participating states are not identical. For Türkiye, Israel has become a more important security concern, whereas for Saudi Arabia the threat of Iran continues to hold greater weight.
The Makkah agreement is an important indicator of the transformation of the US-centric Middle Eastern security system. In Riyadh, doubts have intensified regarding the extent to which domestic political fluctuations and shifts in US strategic priorities may undermine Washington’s reliability as a security guarantor. It is noteworthy that the US President Donald Trump welcomed the Makkah agreement, calling it a “ big, bold, and important first step”. The positive reaction of Trump suggests that Washington does not necessarily perceive the agreement as an anti-American move. It is also compatible with the burden-sharing logic where regional partners assume greater responsibility for their own defense. This attempt to reduce dependence on the US security umbrella does not necessarily imply a rupture in relations with Washington; rather, it may reflect an attempt to diversify security partnerships and expand the strategic maneuvering space of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
Internal contradictions limiting the development of the alliance, gray zone threats and external dependencies
Despite high political expectations, the practical development of the Makkah alliance faces serious structural limitations, internal contradictions, and external dependencies. Just 48 hours after the signing of the agreement, the Yemeni Houthis (Ansar Allah) struck the Saudi Aramco oil refinery located in Jazan, Saudi Arabia. The attacks subsequently escalated: on September 8, 2026, Houthi missile and UAV strikes targeted several Saudi cities and energy facilities, including Abha, Najran, Jazan and Khamis Mushait, injuring 73 people. Since the full text of the agreement is not published, it remains unclear under what conditions attacks by non-state actors activate the collective defense mechanism. The limits of a potential Turkish and Pakistani response also remain uncertain.
The second serious obstacle is the divergence in foreign political priorities, particularly those shaped by the factor of India. For Pakistan, India is the primary security competitor, whereas the relations of the other members of the alliance with New Delhi are built on different political and economic calculations. Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stated that New Delhi is closely monitoring the agreement. These differences limit the potential for extending the alliance’s collective security commitments to conflicts in South Asia.
The subsequent responses of the parties also highlighted the limitations of the collective defence mechanism at this stage. Türkiye strongly condemned the Houthi attacks and reaffirmed its support for Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, on September 10, Pakistan stated that no military response had been discussed under the Makkah agreement. This suggests that, despite the collective defence commitment, its practical activation remains dependent on political consultations among the parties․
Furthermore, the members of the alliance remain dependent on external powers and institutions. The economy of Pakistan continues to be significantly dependent on IMF programs and external financing, and the role of China in its defense sector is highly important. Türkiye is a member of NATO and has allied obligations, while simultaneously maintaining deep economic interdependence with the European Union. Saudi Arabia, despite diversification, continues to remain significantly dependent on American weaponry and security relations with the US.
Finally, the nuclear deterrence system of Pakistan has historically been oriented primarily toward maintaining a strategic balance with India. Regarding extended nuclear deterrence, the public position of Islamabad remains contradictory and uncertain. In 2025, official statements fluctuated between hinting at such a possibility and subsequently retreating from those implications, while the published materials concerning the 2026 trilateral agreement do not clarify this issue.
Summarizing the aforementioned, the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement reflects a broader trend toward greater polycentrism in regional security and the diversification of security partnerships. The alliance can be viewed as a collective response by middle powers to regional instability and growing uncertainty, surrounding external security guarantees. Despite its popular characterization as an “Islamic NATO”, the alliance does not yet have the integrated command structures and automatic response military mechanisms characteristic of NATO.
At this stage, it is more accurate to view the Makkah alliance as an emerging platform for strategic deterrence and military industrial cooperation. Although the alliance officially aims to strengthen collective deterrence against external aggression, the recent Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have provided an early practical test of its collective defense commitments. The absence of a collective military response so far suggests that the effectiveness of its deterrence and collective defence mechanisms remains uncertain. The further stability and development of the alliance will greatly depend on the extent to which the parties succeed in managing foreign political contradictions, including those concerning relations with India and the Western powers, and translating institutional and military-industrial cooperation into practical and sustained mechanisms.
