On August 23, the Ministry of Defense reported yet another non-combat death of a service member in the Armed Forces. The body of serviceman Edgar Gevorgi Gevorgyan was discovered in Military Unit N, with a firearm-related injury. An investigation is underway to fully establish the circumstances of the incident. This is already the third case of non-combat death in the Armed Forces within the past ten days.
The data published on deaths recorded in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia during the first eight months of 2026 point to serious and systemic problems within the Armed Forces.
First and foremost, it must be noted that there is no unified approach to the concept of "non-combat death" in Armenia. In particular, the Vanadzor Office of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (HCA) reported in July of this year that 30 cases of non-combat deaths of service members had been recorded in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia during the first seven months of 2026. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense reports 11 cases for the same period. A discrepancy also exists in the data presented regarding suicide cases: for the same period, the HCA reports 8 suicides, while the Ministry of Defense reports 4. Furthermore, it is known that suicides in the armed forces can fall into three categories — suicide proper, cases of being driven to suicide, and, at least in the past, killings that were quickly classified as suicide.
In this regard, it is important to draw attention to the investigation published on August 20, 2026 by the "Fact-Checking Platform." The investigation found that the statistical data on suicides provided by the Prosecutor's Office do not correspond to the HCA's data. Specifically, according to the Prosecutor's Office, 97 cases of suicide were recorded in the Armed Forces from 2010 to 2026, whereas according to the HCA, the figure is 156. It is also worth noting that, within the scope of the same investigation, inquiries were sent to the Ministry of Defense as well, but to date no response has been received from the state agency.
Given the current situation, we believe that discussions should begin among organizations specializing in civil society in the Republic of Armenia, concerned citizens, and state agencies, with the aim of formulating a common and unified approach to the terminology noted above. We believe that in order to properly address the problem, it is first necessary to clearly define it, and that stakeholders must reach agreement on the substance and boundaries of the problem in order to coordinate their actions. Otherwise, not only does resolving the problem become more complicated, but serious obstacles also arise to effective cooperation between civil society and state institutions. Moreover, the current situation creates fertile ground for a decline in trust and mutual understanding between state institutions and civil society.
Thus, regardless of differences in recording and classification, the recurring cases of non-combat deaths, suicides, and killings demonstrate that the problem cannot be limited to the investigation of isolated incidents alone, and requires examination of the environment in which such risks are formed.
There is a widespread and well-founded view that a significant portion of non-combat casualties occur as a result of vicious practices shaped by the influence of criminal subculture. However, we propose to also consider the problem from another angle. In this causal relationship, criminal subculture is not the cause but rather a mechanism. It cannot be regarded merely as a mirror reflection of phenomena present in society at large, nor should this be used to justify the insufficient and ineffective level of efforts made in this direction to date. The roots of the problem must be sought in the process of organizing service and coexistence in the army, in the procedures governing soldier-to-soldier and soldier-to-officer relations, as well as in the distortions of command culture. To put it more plainly, the inability of certain officers to organize service through statutory channels, a lack of corresponding skills, and insufficient accountability in management have created a vacuum of governance — one that has been filled by non-statutory models of organizing service, which are underpinned, among other factors, by criminal subculture.
This claim is also substantiated by the following observation: in those military units, battalions, or companies where service is properly organized, the number of conflicts — whether among soldiers themselves or between soldiers and officers — is considerably lower. This is particularly notable given that we are speaking of young men conscripted from, in effect, the same society, and largely shaped by similar social environments and mindsets. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that verifying this and other claims, and assessing the actual scale of the problem, requires both quantitative and qualitative research, the necessity and possible methodology of which we discuss in more detail below.
A precise definition of the problem and the identification of its actual causes also make it possible to identify the tools through which the problem should be resolved, whereas a flawed and overly general definition creates a situation in which it is unclear who bears primary responsibility for solving the problem — generating an atmosphere of incapacity in which no one feels ultimately responsible for the situation that has arisen.
Such an understanding of the problem clearly shows that changing the head of the Military Police, or visits by Military Police personnel to military units and meetings with soldiers, are not sufficient to resolve the problem, since the Military Police, within the context of this chain of issues, represents the final link, and cannot, within the scope of its authority and powers, eliminate the root causes of the problem. Moreover, excessive involvement of the Military Police in the process of organizing service could lead to further erosion of officers' standing and accountability — which is itself a principal cause of the current situation.
In recent days, various citizens on social media have presented different manifestations of the organization of service and coexistence shaped by criminal subculture, as a result of which conditions arise in which non-combat deaths occur. The list of similar stories could go on, as there is no shortage of such examples. For this reason, we do not wish to burden this text with numerous examples that, although differing from one another, generally fit within the same overall picture. At the same time, an appropriate mechanism needs to be developed through which such cases and accounts can be systematically collected, documented, and analyzed. We are convinced that one of the principal causes of the current situation is that existing data and information are not properly collected and analyzed, and — more importantly — are not sufficiently taken into account in policy-making.
In this context, the question of morale and psychological well-being in the armed forces must be viewed not only from the standpoint of the army's internal functioning, but from the perspective of the entire security system as a whole. A service member's trust in the system is formed not only through calls, orders, or disciplinary requirements, but through the actual conditions of service, fair treatment, command culture, social guarantees, a sense of protection for oneself and one's family, and the conviction that one's concerns are not being ignored.
The case of soldiers being run over by a vehicle also prompted discussion of the impermissible models employed by officers in organizing service, the insufficient level of communication among various levels of management, as well as shortcomings in the organization of logistics.
In light of this situation, the Yerevan Center for Foreign and Security Policy proposes that discussions begin — with the participation of relevant state agencies, civil society organizations working on this issue, and concerned citizens — with the aim of developing a roadmap for properly addressing the situation. We believe that this process should place central importance on developing a precise formulation of the problem and a methodology for its assessment, the systematic collection and analysis of data, and the promotion of discussions that are as honest, open, and unconstrained as possible. We are confident that a long-term and sustainable solution to the problem cannot be achieved without involving all stakeholders in the processes of defining and resolving it. Political will, integrity, and professional diligence must be of central importance in this process.
On August 23, the Ministry of Defense reported yet another non-combat death of a service member in the Armed Forces. The body of serviceman Edgar Gevorgi Gevorgyan was discovered in Military Unit N, with a firearm-related injury. An investigation is underway to fully establish the circumstances of the incident. This is already the third case of non-combat death in the Armed Forces within the past ten days.
The data published on deaths recorded in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia during the first eight months of 2026 point to serious and systemic problems within the Armed Forces.
First and foremost, it must be noted that there is no unified approach to the concept of "non-combat death" in Armenia. In particular, the Vanadzor Office of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (HCA) reported in July of this year that 30 cases of non-combat deaths of service members had been recorded in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia during the first seven months of 2026. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense reports 11 cases for the same period. A discrepancy also exists in the data presented regarding suicide cases: for the same period, the HCA reports 8 suicides, while the Ministry of Defense reports 4. Furthermore, it is known that suicides in the armed forces can fall into three categories — suicide proper, cases of being driven to suicide, and, at least in the past, killings that were quickly classified as suicide.
In this regard, it is important to draw attention to the investigation published on August 20, 2026 by the "Fact-Checking Platform." The investigation found that the statistical data on suicides provided by the Prosecutor's Office do not correspond to the HCA's data. Specifically, according to the Prosecutor's Office, 97 cases of suicide were recorded in the Armed Forces from 2010 to 2026, whereas according to the HCA, the figure is 156. It is also worth noting that, within the scope of the same investigation, inquiries were sent to the Ministry of Defense as well, but to date no response has been received from the state agency.
Given the current situation, we believe that discussions should begin among organizations specializing in civil society in the Republic of Armenia, concerned citizens, and state agencies, with the aim of formulating a common and unified approach to the terminology noted above. We believe that in order to properly address the problem, it is first necessary to clearly define it, and that stakeholders must reach agreement on the substance and boundaries of the problem in order to coordinate their actions. Otherwise, not only does resolving the problem become more complicated, but serious obstacles also arise to effective cooperation between civil society and state institutions. Moreover, the current situation creates fertile ground for a decline in trust and mutual understanding between state institutions and civil society.
Thus, regardless of differences in recording and classification, the recurring cases of non-combat deaths, suicides, and killings demonstrate that the problem cannot be limited to the investigation of isolated incidents alone, and requires examination of the environment in which such risks are formed.
There is a widespread and well-founded view that a significant portion of non-combat casualties occur as a result of vicious practices shaped by the influence of criminal subculture. However, we propose to also consider the problem from another angle. In this causal relationship, criminal subculture is not the cause but rather a mechanism. It cannot be regarded merely as a mirror reflection of phenomena present in society at large, nor should this be used to justify the insufficient and ineffective level of efforts made in this direction to date. The roots of the problem must be sought in the process of organizing service and coexistence in the army, in the procedures governing soldier-to-soldier and soldier-to-officer relations, as well as in the distortions of command culture. To put it more plainly, the inability of certain officers to organize service through statutory channels, a lack of corresponding skills, and insufficient accountability in management have created a vacuum of governance — one that has been filled by non-statutory models of organizing service, which are underpinned, among other factors, by criminal subculture.
This claim is also substantiated by the following observation: in those military units, battalions, or companies where service is properly organized, the number of conflicts — whether among soldiers themselves or between soldiers and officers — is considerably lower. This is particularly notable given that we are speaking of young men conscripted from, in effect, the same society, and largely shaped by similar social environments and mindsets. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that verifying this and other claims, and assessing the actual scale of the problem, requires both quantitative and qualitative research, the necessity and possible methodology of which we discuss in more detail below.
A precise definition of the problem and the identification of its actual causes also make it possible to identify the tools through which the problem should be resolved, whereas a flawed and overly general definition creates a situation in which it is unclear who bears primary responsibility for solving the problem — generating an atmosphere of incapacity in which no one feels ultimately responsible for the situation that has arisen.
Such an understanding of the problem clearly shows that changing the head of the Military Police, or visits by Military Police personnel to military units and meetings with soldiers, are not sufficient to resolve the problem, since the Military Police, within the context of this chain of issues, represents the final link, and cannot, within the scope of its authority and powers, eliminate the root causes of the problem. Moreover, excessive involvement of the Military Police in the process of organizing service could lead to further erosion of officers' standing and accountability — which is itself a principal cause of the current situation.
In recent days, various citizens on social media have presented different manifestations of the organization of service and coexistence shaped by criminal subculture, as a result of which conditions arise in which non-combat deaths occur. The list of similar stories could go on, as there is no shortage of such examples. For this reason, we do not wish to burden this text with numerous examples that, although differing from one another, generally fit within the same overall picture. At the same time, an appropriate mechanism needs to be developed through which such cases and accounts can be systematically collected, documented, and analyzed. We are convinced that one of the principal causes of the current situation is that existing data and information are not properly collected and analyzed, and — more importantly — are not sufficiently taken into account in policy-making.
In this context, the question of morale and psychological well-being in the armed forces must be viewed not only from the standpoint of the army's internal functioning, but from the perspective of the entire security system as a whole. A service member's trust in the system is formed not only through calls, orders, or disciplinary requirements, but through the actual conditions of service, fair treatment, command culture, social guarantees, a sense of protection for oneself and one's family, and the conviction that one's concerns are not being ignored.
The case of soldiers being run over by a vehicle also prompted discussion of the impermissible models employed by officers in organizing service, the insufficient level of communication among various levels of management, as well as shortcomings in the organization of logistics.
In light of this situation, the Yerevan Center for Foreign and Security Policy proposes that discussions begin — with the participation of relevant state agencies, civil society organizations working on this issue, and concerned citizens — with the aim of developing a roadmap for properly addressing the situation. We believe that this process should place central importance on developing a precise formulation of the problem and a methodology for its assessment, the systematic collection and analysis of data, and the promotion of discussions that are as honest, open, and unconstrained as possible. We are confident that a long-term and sustainable solution to the problem cannot be achieved without involving all stakeholders in the processes of defining and resolving it. Political will, integrity, and professional diligence must be of central importance in this process.
